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Abstract
In this paper, intelligent reflecting surfaces (IRSs) are employed to enhance the physical layer security
in a challenging radio environment. In particular, a multi-antenna access point (AP) has to serve multiple
single-antenna legitimate users, which do not have line-of-sight communication links, in the presence
of multiple multi-antenna potential eavesdroppers whose channel state information (CSI) is not perfectly
known. Artificial noise (AN) is transmitted from the AP to deliberately impair the eavesdropping channels
for security provisioning. We investigate the joint design of the beamformers and AN covariance matrix
at the AP and the phase shifters at the IRSs for maximization of the system sum-rate while limiting the
maximum information leakage to the potential eavesdroppers. To this end, we formulate a robust non-
convex optimization problem taking into account the impact of the imperfect CSI of the eavesdropping
channels. To address the non-convexity of the optimization problem, an efficient algorithm is developed by
capitalizing on alternating optimization, a penalty-based approach, successive convex approximation, and
semidefinite relaxation. Simulation results show that IRSs can significantly improve the system secrecy
performance compared to conventional architectures without IRS. Furthermore, our results unveil that, for
physical layer security, uniformly distributing the reflecting elements among multiple IRSs is preferable
over deploying them at a single IRS.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
Two fundamental properties of the wireless medium, namely broadcast and superposition, make
wireless transmissions inherently vulnerable to security breaches, which has been a pivotal issue in
modern wireless communication systems [2]–[4]. Besides conventional cryptographic encryption
methods employed in the application layer, advanced signal processing techniques developed for
improving the physical layer security have emerged as indispensable means to guarantee secure
wireless communication in recent years [4]. The essential premise of these techniques is to exploit
the intrinsic randomness of the noise and fading characteristics of wireless communication channels
to limit the amount of information that can be extracted by potential eavesdroppers. Various
corresponding approaches have been proposed in the literature including cooperative relaying
[5], artificial noise (AN)-aided beamforming [6], and cooperative jamming [7]. However, the
existing methods to enhance physical layer security in wireless networks have two demerits. First,
deploying relays or other helpers for security provisioning incurs high hardware cost and consumes
additional energy. Second, it is difficult to guarantee secure communication in unfavorable wireless
propagation environments even if AN or jamming signals are transmitted. However, in practice,
wireless channels cannot be adaptively controlled with traditional communication technologies as
would be desirable for secure communication. To overcome these two shortcomings of existing
systems, a new cost-effective and energy-efficient paradigm is needed which is capable of altering
the radio propagation environment.
Benefiting from the rapid evolution of radio frequency (RF) micro-electro-mechanical systems
(MEMS), programmable and reconfigurable metasurfaces have found abundant applications in
different domains in recent years [8]. Among various types of metasurfaces, intelligent reflecting
surfaces (IRSs), a kind of passive metasurface, are particularly appealing and have been recently
exploited for wireless communication system design [9]–[13]. Specifically, IRSs are able to change
the end-to-end signal propagation direction with low-cost passive components, e.g., printed dipoles
and phase shifters, which is a revolutionary new characteristic that has not been leveraged in
any of the contemporary wireless systems. Furthermore, metasurfaces in the form of artificial
thin films can be easily coated on existing infrastructures such as walls of buildings, which
reduces the operational expenditure and complexity of deploying IRSs. Hence, IRSs hold great
promise for many applications as they provide a cost-effective approach to control the radio
propagation environment while avoiding the deployment of additional power-hungry and expensive
communication devices, e.g., amplify-and-forward relays [14]. In particular, these characteristics
3position IRSs as a key enabler for improving the physical layer security of wireless communication
systems in an economical and energy-efficient manner [15]. However, to fully unleash the potential
of IRSs for security provisioning, joint optimization of the IRSs and conventional approaches to
enhance physical layer security, such as transmit beamforming and AN injection at the access
point (AP), is required.
Recently, the amalgamation of IRSs and physical layer security has received significant attention
in the literature. Initial results on IRS-assisted secure wireless systems were provided in [1], [16],
[17], starting from a simple network model with only one legitimate user and one eavesdropper.
As a matter of fact, one of the difficulties for algorithm design for IRS-assisted systems are
the highly non-convex unit modulus constraints induced by the phase shifter implementation of
IRSs. Based on semidefinite relaxation (SDR) and Gaussian randomization methods, suboptimal
solutions for both the beamformer at the AP and the phase shifts at the IRS were developed in [17].
Majorization minimization techniques were leveraged in [1], [16] to tackle the non-convex unit
modulus constraints, which led to a better performance compared to the classical SDR method.
Secure wireless systems comprising multiple legitimate users and multiple eavesdroppers were
investigated in [18] and [19], respectively, where manifold optimization and SDR were applied to
handle the non-convexity of the formulated problems. To guarantee secure communication, joint
optimization of transmit beamforming and AN injection at the AP were considered in both [18] and
[19]. The authors of [20] studied the maximization of the minimum secrecy rate among several
legitimate users in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers, where the unit modulus constraints
of the phase shifters were approximated by a set of convex constraints. Although this approach
considerably simplifies the algorithm design, it may lead to a significant performance loss. All
these existing works [1], [16]–[20] assumed that the potential eavesdroppers are equipped with
a single antenna and perfect channel state information (CSI) of the eavesdropping channels is
available at the AP. However, in practice, a worst-case assumption is needed for successful
security provisioning, i.e., the eavesdroppers are expected to possess more hardware resources
and computational capabilities than the legitimate users, e.g., antenna elements and interference
mitigation capabilities. Furthermore, acquiring perfect CSI of the eavesdropping channels at the
AP is challenging since potential eavesdroppers are not continuously interacting with the AP and
the corresponding CSI at the AP may be outdated even if the channel is only slowly time-varying.
Therefore, the assumptions of single-antenna eavesdroppers and perfect eavesdropper CSI at the AP
are generally overly optimistic which weakens the generality and practicality of the system models
4considered in [1], [16]–[20] and the associated resource allocation algorithm designs. To the best
of the authors’ knowledge, the design of robust and secure IRS-assisted wireless communication
systems with multi-antenna eavesdroppers has not been studied in the literature, yet.
To address the aforementioned issues, this paper investigates physical layer security provisioning
for IRS-assisted wireless systems, where a multi-antenna AP transmits confidential data to multiple
single-antenna legitimate users in the presence of several multi-antenna potential eavesdroppers. To
help establish a favorable propagation environment for secure communication, IRSs implemented
by programmable phase shifters are deployed. The system sum-rate is maximized by taking into
account the imperfect knowledge of the CSI of the eavesdropping channels, while the maximum
information leakage to the potential eavesdroppers is constrained. To this end, the design of the
considered robust and secure IRS-assisted multiuser multiple-input single-output (MISO) system is
formulated as a non-convex optimization problem. The highly non-convex unit modulus constraints
induced by the phase shifter implementation and the infinitely many inequality constraints intro-
duced by the imperfect CSI are the main challenges for solving the problem. First, an efficient
alternating optimization (AO) based approach is developed to tackle the non-convexity of the
problem, and subsequently, the design of the transmit beamformers, AN covariance matrix, and
IRS phase shifts is handled by successive convex approximation (SCA) and SDR-based methods.
In particular, the non-convex IRS phase shift design problem with unit modulus constraints is
reformulated as an equivalent rank-constrained problem, for which an effective difference of
convex (d.c.) function representation is adopted to handle the rank-one constraint. Simulation
results confirm the effectiveness of the AO based algorithm compared to various baseline methods.
Furthermore, our results reveal that by deploying IRSs, favorable channel conditions are created
for the legitimate users, and therefore, the physical layer security of wireless systems can be
significantly improved. Moreover, we show that uniformly distributing the reflecting elements
across multiple IRSs is beneficial for enhancing the secrecy performance.
Notations: In this paper, the imaginary unit of a complex number is denoted by  =
√−1.
Matrices and vectors are denoted by boldface capital and lower-case letters, respectively. The
set of nonnegative integers is denoted as N = {0, 1, · · · }. Cm×n denotes the set of all m ×
n complex-valued matrices; Hm denotes the set of all m × m Hermitian matrices; Im is the
m-dimensional identity matrix; 1m represents the m × 1 all-ones vector; 0 represents the all-
zeros matrix. X∗, XT , and XH stand for the conjugate, transpose, and conjugate transpose of
matrix X, respectively. The `2-norm of vector x is denoted as ||x||. The determinant, Frobenius
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Fig. 1. An IRS-assisted multiuser MISO secure communication system comprising K = 3 legitimate users, J = 2 roaming users,
and L = 2 IRSs coated on two buildings. The reflecting elements are represented by green rectangles. For the ease of illustration,
only the parameters of the channels from the IRSs to potential eavesdropper 1 and legitimate user 3 are shown.
norm, nuclear norm, and spectral norm of matrix X are represented as det(X), ‖X‖F , ‖X‖∗,
and ‖X‖2, respectively. diag(X1, · · · ,Xn) denotes a diagonal matrix whose diagonal components
are X1, · · · ,Xn; Diag(X) represents a vector whose elements are extracted from the diagonal
elements of matrix X. The largest eigenvalue of matrix X and the corresponding eigenvector are
denoted by λmax(X) and λmax(X), respectively. , and ∼ mean “defined as” and “distributed as”,
respectively. Tr(X) and Rank(X) denote the trace and rank of matrix X; X  0 indicates that
X is a positive semidefinite (PSD) matrix. The distribution of a circularly symmetric complex
Gaussian (CSCG) vector with mean vector x and covariance matrix Σ is denoted by CN (x,Σ).
For a real-valued continuous function f(X), ∇Xf represents the gradient of f with respect to
matrix X. E[·] represents statistical expectation and [x]+ = max{0, x}. The optimal value of an
optimization variable X is denoted by X?.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we first present the system model for secure IRS-assisted multiuser MISO
downlink wireless communication. Then, we discuss our assumptions regarding CSI knowledge
for system design.
A. IRS-Assisted System Model
We consider the downlink of an IRS-assisted secure communication system that comprises one
AP, K single-antenna legitimate users, J roaming users, and L IRSs, as shown in Fig. 1. The AP
6is be equipped with Nt > 1 transmit antennas. Different from the local legitimate users, the J
roaming users are traveling wireless devices belonging to other communication systems and are
equipped with Nr > 1 antennas. The roaming users may attempt to deliberately eavesdrop the
signals transmitted to the legitimate users. Therefore, we treat the J roaming users as potential
eavesdroppers. In addition, L passive IRSs are deployed in the network to improve the physical
layer security, where IRS l is equipped with Ml programmable phase shifters. The direct links
from the AP to the legitimate users are assumed to be blocked by obstacles (e.g., buildings). As
a result, the AP communicates with the legitimate users via the IRSs and focuses its transmit
beams on the IRSs. We assume that both the AP and the IRSs are deployed at sufficiently high
altitudes such that the potential eavesdroppers cannot intercept the links between the AP and
the IRSs. Furthermore, as the beams reflected by the IRSs to the legitimate users and potential
eavesdroppers are typically tilting down to the ground to serve the legitimate users, reflections
between IRSs are negligible. Therefore, the downlink received baseband signals at legitimate user
k and potential eavesdropper j can be expressed as1
yk =
∑
l∈L
hHklΦlGl
(∑
i∈K
wisi + z
)
+ nk = h
H
k ΦG
(∑
i∈K
wisi + z
)
+ nk, ∀k ∈ K,
yj =
∑
l∈L
HjlΦlGl
(∑
i∈K
wisi + z
)
+ nj = HjΦG
(∑
i∈K
wisi + z
)
+ nj, ∀j ∈ J ,
(1)
respectively, where L = {1, · · · , L}, K = {1, · · · , K}, J = {1, · · · , J}, hHk =
[
hHk1, · · · ,hHkL
]
,
Hj = [Hj1, · · · ,HjL], Φ = diag (Φ1, · · · ,ΦL), and G = [G1, · · · ,GL]T . Here, the information-
bearing signal transmitted by the AP to legitimate user i and the corresponding beamforming
vector are denoted as si ∈ C and wi ∈ CNt×1, respectively, where E[|si|2] = 1, ∀i, without loss of
generality. The channel matrix from the AP to IRS l is denoted as Gl ∈ CMl×Nt , while the channel
vector between legitimate user k and IRS l is represented by hHkl ∈ C1×Ml . Hjl ∈ CNr×Ml is the
channel matrix between eavesdropper j and IRS l. The phase shift matrix Φl at IRS l is given by
Φl = diag(e
θl1 , eθl2 , · · · , eθlMl ), where θli is the controllable phase shift introduced by the i-th
reflecting element of IRS l [22]. In addition, nk ∼ CN
(
0, σ2l,k
)
and nj ∼ CN
(
0, σ2e,jINr
)
represent
the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) at legitimate user k and potential eavesdropper j, with
σ2l,k and σ
2
e,j being the corresponding noise variances, respectively. z ∈ CNt×1 is the AN vector
1For multiple IRSs, the delays between the propagation paths reflected by different IRSs are typically much shorter than the
symbol duration. For example, in a small cell network with 200 m cell radius, the maximum delay is 1.3 µs while the symbol
duration in the Long-Term Evolution (LTE) standard is 70 µs [21]. Thus, intersymbol interference is not considered in (1).
7generated by the AP to deliberately combat the eavesdroppers. Specifically, z is modeled as a CSCG
vector with z ∼ CN (0,Z), where Z ∈ HNt , Z  0, is the covariance matrix of the AN vector.
The AN is assumed to be unknown to both the legitimate users and the potential eavesdroppers.
For notational convenience, in the rest of this paper, we drop index l in the elements of the phase
shift matrices of all IRSs and use Φ = diag(eθ1 , eθ2 , · · · , eθM ), where M = ∑l∈LMl.
Remark 1: The legitimate users are expected to have limited capabilities compared to the poten-
tial eavesdroppers. In order to ensure secure communication under such unfavorable conditions,
we consider the worst case where all legitimate users are equipped with a single antenna while
all potential eavesdroppers have multiple antennas.
Remark 2: We assume that resource allocation is performed separately for blocked and non-
blocked legitimate users, respectively, via user scheduling. In this paper, we focus on the resource
allocation for blocked legitimate users which are supported by multiple IRSs.
B. Channel State Information (CSI)
In this paper, we assume slowly time-varying channels. The AP is able to periodically update and
refine the CSI of the legitimate users based on uplink pilots. In particular, the pilots are embedded
in the handshaking signals and acknowledgment (ACK) packets transmitted by the legitimate
users to the AP at the beginning of each scheduling slot and during the data transmission phase,
respectively. Hence, we assume the availability of perfect CSI for the AP-IRS-legitimate user
links, G and {hk}Kk=1, during the whole transmission period. On the other hand, for the potential
eavesdroppers (roaming users), they send signals to their dedicated wireless systems rather than
the AP. Furthermore, as the potential eavesdroppers usually try to hide their existence from the
AP, their interactions with the dedicated systems are less frequent. Therefore, although the signal
leakage from the potential eavesdroppers to the AP can still be utilized for channel estimation
[23], [24], the acquired CSI may be coarse and outdated. To account for this effect, we adopt
a deterministic model [25]–[27] to characterize the CSI uncertainty. Specifically, the CSI of the
links between the IRSs and eavesdropper j is modeled as follows
Hj = H¯j + ∆Hj, Ωj ,
{
∆Hj ∈ CNr×M : ||∆Hj||F ≤ j
}
, j ∈ J , (2)
where H¯j ∈ CNr×M is the estimate of the channel of potential eavesdropper j at the AP at
the beginning of the scheduling slot. The CSI uncertainty of eavesdropper j is modeled by the
term ∆Hj . Continuous set Ωj contains all possible CSI uncertainties with their norms bounded by
8j > 0. The uncertainty radius j represents the level of uncertainty, which in practice is determined
by the channel coherence time, transmission rate, and adopted channel estimation algorithm.
III. RESOURCE ALLOCATION PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we define the adopted performance metrics and formulate the resource allocation
design as an optimization problem.
A. Achievable Rate and Secrecy Rate
According to the signal model in (1), the achievable rate (bits/s/Hz) of legitimate user k is given
by
Rk = log2
(
1 +
∣∣hHk ΦGwk∣∣2
Tr (GHΦHhkhHk ΦGZ) + σ
2
l,k +
∑
i∈K\{k} |hHk ΦGwi|2
)
. (3)
Then, for security provisioning, we make a worst-case assumption regarding the capabilities of the
potential eavesdroppers. In particular, we assume that the potential eavesdroppers have unlimited
computational resources and therefore are able to cancel all multiuser interference before decoding
the information transmitted to a given legitimate user. Therefore, the channel capacity (bits/s/Hz)
between the AP and potential eavesdropper j for decoding the signal of legitimate user k is given
by
Cj,k = log2 det
(
INr + Q
−1
j HjΦGwkw
H
k G
HΦHHHj
)
, (4)
where Qj = HjΦGZGHΦHHHj +σ
2
e,jINr is the noise covariance matrix at potential eavesdropper
j. Hence, the maximum achievable secrecy rate between the AP and legitimate user k is given by
Rs,k =
[
Rk −max
j∈J
{Cj,k}
]+
, (5)
and the system sum secrecy rate is given by Rs =
∑
k∈KRs,k.
B. Optimization Problem Formulation
In this paper, we adopt a worst-case robust sum-rate maximization (WCR-SRM) problem
formulation for norm-bounded CSI uncertainties [28]. In particular, our goal is to maximize the
system sum-rate while keeping the maximum information leakage to the eavesdroppers below a
desired level2. The joint design of the transmit beamformers and AN at the AP and the phase
2Note that the considered WCR-SRM formulation with information leakage constraints offers a higher flexibility for resource
allocation than the direct maximization of the secrecy rate with respect to the heterogeneous secrecy requirement of different
applications, e.g., video streaming, emails, Internet of Things, etc. In particular, the secrecy performance of each potential
eavesdropper can be controlled via the information leakage parameter τk,j , which allows to strike a balance between the system
sum-rate and the system secrecy rate.
9shifts at the IRSs can be formulated as follows
maximize
wk,Φ,Z∈HNt
∑
k∈K
log2
(
1 +
∣∣hHk ΦGwk∣∣2
Tr (GHΦHhkhHk ΦGZ) + σ
2
l,k +
∑
i∈K\{k} |hHk ΦGwi|2
)
subject to C1:
∑
k∈K
‖wk‖2 + Tr (Z) ≤ P, C2: Z  0,
C3: Φ = diag
(
eθ1 , eθ2 , · · · , eθM) ,
C4: max
∆Hj∈Ωj
log2 det
(
INr + Q
−1
j HjΦGwkw
H
k G
HΦHHHj
) ≤ τk,j, ∀k, j.
(6)
In constraint C1, P is a nonnegative parameter denoting the maximum transmit power of the
AP. Constraint C2 and Z ∈ HNt are imposed as the covariance matrix of the AN is a Hermitian
PSD matrix. Since the IRSs are assumed to be implemented by a total of M passive phase
shifters, the equivalent phase shift matrix Φ is constrained to be a diagonal matrix with M
unit modulus elements, as specified by constraint C3. The physical layer security of the system
is guaranteed by constraint C4 such that the system secrecy rate is bounded from below by
Rs ≥
∑
k∈K
[
Rk −max
j∈J
{τk,j}
]+
. Here, τk,j is a predefined parameter which limits the maximum
tolerable information leakage to potential eavesdropper j for wiretapping the signal transmitted to
legitimate user k.
Obtaining the globally optimal solution for the formulated problem (6) is highly intractable. In
particular, the objective function is not jointly concave with respect to wk, Φ, and Z since Φ is
coupled with wk and Z in both the numerator and denominator of the signal-to-interference-plus-
noise ratio (SINR) term inside the logarithm. In addition, constraint C4 comprises infinitely many
inequality constraints due to the continuity of the CSI uncertainty sets, which introduces another
challenge for solving problem (6). More importantly, constraint C3 is highly non-convex as the
phase of each phase shifter is constrained to have unit magnitude. To the best of the authors’
knowledge, there is no general approach to solving problem (6) optimally. In the next section, we
shall propose an effective algorithm to find a locally optimal solution for problem (6).
IV. ALGORITHM DESIGN FOR SECURE IRS-ASSISTED WIRELESS COMMUNICATION
In this section, we focus on solving the formulated optimization problem. First, we tackle the
coupling of the optimization variables via AO. In fact, AO is a widely applicable and empirically
efficient approach for handling optimization problems involving coupled optimization variables. It
has been successfully applied to several wireless communication design problems such as hybrid
precoding [29], resource allocation [30], and IRS-enabled wireless communication [1]. For the
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problem at hand, based on the principle of AO, we alternately solve for {wk,Z} and Φ while
fixing the other variables. This yields a stationary point solution of problem (6) as will be detailed
in the following two subsections.
A. Optimization of Transmit Beamforming and AN
We first present the optimization of the beamforming vectors wk and AN covariance matrix
Z for a given phase shift matrix Φ. In particular, we first convert the infinitely many constraints
in constraint C4 to a finite number of equivalent constraints. To develop efficient algorithms for
optimizing wk and Z, SDR and SCA techniques are then leveraged to tackle the non-convexity
of both the objective function and the constraints of problem (6). Now, for a given phase shift
matrix Φ, the optimization problem for the design of wk and Z is given by
maximize
wk,Z∈HNt
∑
k∈K
log2
(
1 +
∣∣hHk ΦGwk∣∣2
Tr (GHΦHhkhHk ΦGZ) + σ
2
l,k +
∑
i∈K\{k} |hHk ΦGwi|2
)
subject to C1:
∑
k∈K
‖wk‖2 + Tr (Z) ≤ P, C2: Z  0,
C4: max
∆Hj∈Ωj
log2 det
(
INr + Q
−1
j HjΦGwkw
H
k G
HΦHHHj
) ≤ τk,j, ∀k, j.
(7)
Constraint C4 is a non-convex constraint involving infinitely many inequality constraints due to
the continuity of the CSI uncertainty sets Ωj . To overcome this difficulty, we first convert the
infinite number of constraints in C4 to an equivalent form with only a finite number of constraints
by leveraging the following proposition and lemma.
Proposition 1. Constraint C4 has the following equivalent representation
C4⇔ max
∆Hj∈Ωj
HjΦG
[
(2τk,j − 1) Z−wkwHk
]
GHΦHHHj + σ
2
e,j (2
τk,j − 1) INr  0. (8)
Proof: See Appendix A.
While constraint C4 is transformed in Proposition 1 into a more tractable form in terms of
linear matrix inequalities (LMIs), there are still an infinite number of such LMIs. To tackle this
challenge, we resort to the following lemma to convert constraint C4 into an equivalent form
involving a finite number of LMIs.
Lemma 1. (Generalized S-Procedure [31, Prop. 3.4]) Consider the quadratic matrix inequality
(QMI)
h(X) = XHAX + XHB + BHX + C  0, ∀X ∈ {Y | Tr (DYYH) ≤ 1,D  0} , (9)
11
where A,D ∈ Hm, X,B ∈ Cm×n, and C ∈ Hn. This QMI holds if and only if there exist p ≥ 0
such that C BH
B A
− p
In 0
0 −D
  0, (10)
provided that there exists a point Xˆ such that h(Xˆ)  0.
Substituting (2) into (8), we can recast constraint C4 as follows
∆HjΦRkΦ
H∆HHj + H¯jΦRkΦ
H∆HHj + ∆HjΦRkΦ
HH¯Hj
+ H¯jΦRkΦ
HH¯Hj + σ
2
e,j (2
τk,j − 1) INr  0, ∀∆Hj ∈
{
Y | Tr (−2j YYH) ≤ 1} , (11)
where Rk , G
[
(2τk,j − 1) Z−wkwHk
]
GH . Then, by applying Lemma 1, constraint C4 is further
expressed as
C4⇔ C4: Pk,j + SjΦRkΦHSHj  0, ∀k, j, (12)
where
Pk,j =
[σ2e,j (2τk,j − 1)− pk,j] INr 0
0 pk,j
−2
j IM
 , Sj =
H¯j
IM
 , (13)
and pk,j ≥ 0, ∀k, j. The transformed constraint C4 involves only KJ LMI constraints, which is
more amenable for algorithm design compared to the infinitely many constraints in the original
constraint C4. However, the resulting optimization problem is still not jointly convex with respect to
pk,j , wk, and Z. To proceed, we recast the optimization problem as a rank-constrained semidefinite
programming (SDP) problem. With Wk , wkwHk problem (7) can be rewritten as
minimize
pk,j≥0,Wk,Z∈HNt
−
∑
k∈K
log2
(
1 +
Tr (MkWk)
Tr (MkZ) + σ2l,k +
∑
i∈K\{k}Tr (MkWi)
)
subject to C1:
∑
k∈K
Tr (Wk) + Tr (Z) ≤ P, C2: Z  0,
C4: Pk,j + SjΦG [(2τk,j − 1) Z−Wk] GHΦHSHj  0, ∀k, j,
C5: Wk  0, C6: Rank (Wk) ≤ 1, ∀k,
(14)
where Mk = GHΦHhkhHk ΦG. The constraints Wk  0, Wk ∈ HNt , and Rank (Wk) ≤ 1
are imposed to guarantee that Wk = wkwHk still holds after optimizing Wk. All constraints
of problem (14) are convex except for constraint C6. Next, we tackle the non-convexity of the
12
objective function in problem (14). To enable efficient algorithm design, we first rewrite the
objective function in form of d.c. functions, i.e.,
−
∑
k∈K
log2
(
1 +
Tr (MkWk)
Tr (MkZ) + σ2l,k +
∑
i∈K\{k}Tr (MkWi)
)
= N −D1, (15)
where
N = −
∑
k∈K
log2
(
Tr (ZMk) + σ
2
l,k +
∑
i∈K
Tr (WiMk)
)
,
D1 = −
∑
k∈K
log2
Tr (ZMk) + σ2l,k + ∑
i∈K\{k}
Tr (WiMk)
 (16)
are two functions that are both jointly convex in terms of pk,j , Wk, and Z. Now, we adopt the
SCA method to obtain a convex upper bound for the objective function in an iterative manner. To
facilitate SCA, we construct a global underestimator for function D1, where we use superscript
(t) to denote the iteration index of the optimization variables. In particular, for any feasible point
W(t) ,
{
W
(t)
k
}K
k=1
and Z(t), a lower bound of function D1 is given by its first-order Taylor
approximation, which can be expressed as
D1 (W,Z) ≥ D1
(
W(t),Z(t)
)
+ Tr
(∇HZD1 (W(t),Z(t)) (Z− Z(t)))
+
∑
k∈K
Tr
(
∇HWkD1
(
W(t),Z(t)
) (
Wk −W(t)k
))
,
(17)
where the gradients of function D1 with respect to Z and Wk are given by
∇ZD1 (W,Z) = − 1
ln 2
∑
j∈K
Mj
Tr (ZMj) + σ2l,j +
∑
i∈K\{j}Tr (WiMj)
and
∇WkD1 (W,Z) = −
1
ln 2
∑
j 6=k
Mj
Tr (ZMj) + σ2l,j +
∑
i∈K\{j}Tr (WiMj)
,
(18)
respectively. By employing this upper bound on the objective function, the only remaining non-
convexity of problem (14) is due to rank constraint C6. Generally, solving such a rank-constrained
problem is known to be NP-hard [32]. To overcome this issue, we adopt the SDR technique and
drop the rank constraint C6. Therefore, the resulting problem that needs to be solved at feasible
point W(t) and Z(t) is given by
minimize
pk,j≥0,Wk,Z∈HNt
N − Tr (∇HZD1 (W(t),Z(t))Z)−∑
k∈K
Tr
(∇HWkD1 (W(t),Z(t))Wk)
subject to C1:
∑
k∈K
Tr (Wk) + Tr (Z) ≤ P, C2: Z  0, C5: Wk  0, ∀k, (19)
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C4: Pk,j + SjΦG [(2τk,j − 1) Z−Wk] GHΦHSHj  0, ∀k, j.
This relaxed problem is jointly convex with respect to pk,j , Wk, and Z, and hence can be efficiently
solved by standard convex program solvers such as CVX [33]. However, in general, there is no
guarantee that the solution obtained by SDR satisfies the rank constraint. Nevertheless, we prove
the tightness of the SDR method for problem (19) in the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Suppose the optimal solution of problem (19) is denoted as
{
W?k,Z
?, p?k,j
}
, where
Rank (W?k) > 1. Then, there always exists another optimal solution of problem (19), denoted as{
W˜?k, Z˜
?, p˜?k,j
}
, which not only achieves the same objective value as
{
W?k,Z
?, p?k,j
}
, but also
meets the rank constraint, i.e., Rank
(
W˜?k
)
≤ 1.
Proof: See Appendix B for the proof of Theorem 1. The construction of the optimal rank-one
solution is given in (41).
Theorem 1 indicates that we can always obtain or construct a rank-constrained optimal solution
for problem (19). In addition, according to Theorem 1, the optimal beamforming vector w?k can
always be recovered from W˜?k given in (41) by performing Cholesky decomposition, i.e., W˜
?
k =
w?k (w
?
k)
H .
B. Optimization of Phase Shifts at IRSs
Next, we present the optimization of phase shift matrix Φ for given transmit beamforming
vectors wk and AN covariance matrix Z. By applying Lemma 1, the optimization problem for the
IRSs is given by
minimize
pk,j≥0,Φ
−
∑
k∈K
log2
(
1 +
∣∣hHk ΦGwk∣∣2
Tr (GHΦHhkhHk ΦGZ) + σ
2
l,k +
∑
i∈K\{k} |hHk ΦGwi|2
)
subject to C3: Φ = diag
(
eθ1 , eθ2 , · · · , eθM) , C4: Pk,j + SjΦRkΦHSHj  0, ∀k, j.
(20)
The main difficulty in solving problem (20) is the unit modulus constraint C3 on the main diagonal
elements of Φ. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, there is no general approach to solve unit
modulus constrained non-convex optimization problems optimally. In this paper, we propose to
rewrite problem (20) by adopting v , Diag (Φ) as the optimization variable instead of Φ itself,
which paves the way for leveraging SDP and SCA methods to facilitate the design of an efficient
algorithm for secure IRS-assisted systems. To start with, we first take constraint C4 as an example
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to illustrate the proposed reformulation. By performing the singular value decomposition (SVD)
of Rk =
∑
i pk,iq
H
k,i, we have
SjΦRkΦ
HSHj =
∑
i
SjΦpk,iq
H
k,iΦ
HSHj =
∑
i
Sjdiag (pk,i) vv
Hdiag
(
qHk,i
)
SHj . (21)
Then, the objective function can be rewritten as a function of v in a similar manner as (21). To
facilitate SDP, we define V , vvH , and therefore problem (20) can be recast as
minimize
pk,j≥0,V∈HM
−
∑
k∈K
log2
(
1 +
Tr
(
LkWkL
H
k V
T
)
Tr (LkZLHk V
T ) + σ2l,k +
∑
i∈K\{k}Tr (LkWiL
H
k V
T )
)
subject to C4: Pk,j +
∑
i
Sjdiag (pk,i) Vdiag
(
qHk,i
)
SHj  0, ∀k, j,
C7: Diag (V) = 1M , C8: V  0, C9: Rank (V) = 1,
(22)
where Lk = diag
(
hHk
)
G. Constraints V ∈ HM , C8, and C9 are imposed to guarantee that
V = vvH holds after optimization. More importantly, constraint C7 is introduced to guarantee
the unit modulus constraint when recovering v from V.
Recall that for the optimization of Wk and Z, we have temporarily removed the rank constraint
on Wk and proved the tightness of the SDR method. However, due to the presence of constraint
C7 induced by the unit modulus constraint, the rank of the solution obtained from problem (22)
is generally larger than one [32]. As a result, instead of applying the SDR method adopted in
Section IV-A, we handle the rank-one constraint via a different approach. In particular, we first
rewrite the rank-one constraint C9 in an equivalent form:
C9⇔ C9: ‖V‖∗ − ‖V‖2 ≤ 0. (23)
Note that for any X ∈ Hm×n, the inequality ‖X‖∗ =
∑
i σi ≥ ‖X‖2 = maxi {σi} holds, where
σi is the i-th singular value of X. Equality holds if and only if X has unit rank. Constraint C9
ensures this equality, which is equivalent to enforcing constraint C9.
Constraint C9 is in a d.c. form and therefore still non-convex with respect to V. To overcome
the non-convexity, we apply a penalty-based method as in [34, Ch. 17], [35] by moving constraint
C9 into the objective function, which results in the following optimization problem
minimize
pk,j≥0,V∈HM
N −D1 + 1
2ρ
(‖V‖∗ − ‖V‖2)
subject to C4: Pk,j +
∑
i
Sjdiag (pk,i) Vdiag
(
qHk,i
)
SHj  0, ∀k, j,
C7: Diag (V) = 1M , C8: V  0,
(24)
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where ρ > 0 is a penalty factor penalizing the violation of constraint C9, and the following
proposition states the equivalence of problems (22) and (24).
Proposition 2. Let Vs be the optimal solution of problem (24) for penalty factor ρs. When ρs is
sufficiently small, i.e., for ρs → 0, then any limit point V¯ of the sequence {Vs} is an optimal
solution of problem (22).
Proof: See Appendix C.
Proposition 2 implies that we can obtain a rank-one solution V¯ by solving problem (24) for a
sufficiently small value of penalty factor ρ. In other words, the diagonal elements of the phase shift
matrix Φ, i.e., v, can always be recovered from the rank-one solution V¯ by performing Cholesky
decomposition of V¯ = vvH . Since after the proposed series of transformations, the constraints in
problem (24) form a convex set, we may adopt a similar approach as in Section IV-A to tackle the
d.c. objective function and employ SCA. In particular, for any feasible point V(t), a lower bound
for D2 = D1 + 12ρ ‖V‖2 is obtained as
D2 (V) ≥ D2
(
V(t)
)
+ Tr
(∇HVD2 (V(t)) (V −V(t))) , (25)
where
∇VD2 = 1
2ρ
λmax (V)λ
H
max (V)−
1
ln 2
∑
k∈K
L∗k
(
ZT +
∑
i∈K\{k}W
T
i
)
LTk
Tr (LkZLHk V
T ) + σ2l,k +
∑
i∈K\{k}Tr (LkWiL
H
k V
T )
.
(26)
Therefore, the optimization problem to be solved for a given feasible point V(t) becomes
minimize
pk,j≥0,V∈HM
1
2ρ
‖V‖∗ +N − Tr
(∇HVD2 (V(t))V)
subject to C4: Pk,j +
∑
i
Sjdiag (pk,i) Vdiag
(
qHk,i
)
SHj  0, ∀k, j,
C7: Diag (V) = 1M , C8: V  0.
(27)
This optimization problem is jointly convex with respect to pk,j and V, and hence it can be
efficiently solved by standard convex program solvers such as CVX [33].
The overall AO algorithm proposed in this section is summarized in Algorithm 1. Note that
the minimum values of problems (19) and (27) serve as upper bounds for the optimal values of
problems (14) and (24), respectively. By iteratively solving problems (19) and (27) optimally in
Steps 3 and 5 in Algorithm 1, we can monotonically tighten these upper bounds. In this way, the
objective values achieved by the sequence
{
w(t),Z(t),Φ(t)
}
t∈N form a non-increasing sequence
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Algorithm 1 Alternating Optimization Algorithm
1: Randomly construct the initial points w(0)k and Z
(0). Initialize Φ(0) with random phases. Set
convergence tolerance ε and iteration index t = 0;
2: repeat
3: Find W(t+1)k and Z
(t+1) by solving problem (19) for the given Φ = Φ(t);
4: Set V(t) = Diag
(
Φ(t)
)
Diag
(
Φ(t)
)H ;
5: Solve problem (27) for given Wk = W
(t+1)
k and Z = Z
(t+1), and update V(t+1);
6: Decompose V(t+1) = v(t+1)
(
v(t+1)
)H and update Φ(t+1) = diag (v(t+1));
7: t← t+ 1;
8: until
∑
k∈K
(
R
(t)
k −R
(t−1)
k
)
∑
k∈KR
(t−1)
k
≤ ε
that converges to a stationary value in polynomial time, and any limit point of the sequence{
w(t),Z(t),Φ(t)
}
t∈N is a stationary point of problem (6) [36]. Furthermore, the computational com-
plexity of each iteration of the proposed AO algorithm is given by O (2K3J3 +K2J2 (M2 +N2t ))
[37, Th. 3.12], where O(·) is the big-O notation.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
A. Simulation Setup
The schematic system model for the simulated single-cell network is shown in Fig. 2. The AP
is located at the center of the cell with radius R. The legitimate users and potential eavesdroppers
are randomly and uniformly distributed in the cell. Note that one of the motivations for deploying
IRSs in secure wireless systems is to establish favorable communication links for legitimate users
that would otherwise be blocked. To illustrate this effect, we consider a scenario where L IRSs
are deployed to improve the secrecy performance of K legitimate users whose direct links to the
AP are blocked by obstacles. Each potential eavesdropper is equipped with Nr = 2 antennas. The
channel matrix Gl between the AP and IRS l is modeled as follows
Gl =
√
L0d
−αl
l
(√
βl
1 + βl
GLl +
√
1
1 + βl
GNl
)
, (28)
where L0 =
(
λc
4pi
)2 is a constant with λc being the wavelength of the center frequency of the
information carrier. The distance between the AP and IRS l is denoted by dl while αl is the
corresponding path loss exponent. The small-scale fading is assumed to be Ricean fading with
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Fig. 2. Simulation setup for an IRS-assisted multiuser MISO se-
cure communication system, which consists of K = 3 legitimate
users, J = 2 potential eavesdroppers, and L = 2 IRSs.
TABLE I
SYSTEM PARAMETERS
Carrier center frequency 2.4 GHz
Path loss exponents for channels with
2 and 4
and without LoS components, αl
Ricean factors for channels with
5 and 0
and without LoS components, βl
Noise power at the legitimate users and −90 dBm
potential eavesdroppers, σ2l,k and σ
2
e,j
Cell radius, R 200 m
Penalty factor, ρ 5× 10−4
Convergence tolerance, ε 10−3
Ricean factor βl. The LoS and non-LoS components are represented by GLl and G
N
l , which are
modeled as the product of the array response vectors of the transceivers and Rayleigh fading,
respectively. The other channels in the system are generated in a similar manner as we expect that
legitimate users with LoS links to the IRSs are served and the potential eavesdroppers may also
position themselves in the LoS of the IRSs. To facilitate the presentation, we define the maximum
normalized estimation error of the eavesdropping channels as κj = j/
∥∥H¯j∥∥F , ∀j. The system
parameters used for our simulations are listed in Table I.
B. Baseline Schemes
We adopt two baseline schemes for comparison. For baseline 1, we adopt simple design choices
without performing iterative optimization. In particular, we adopt maximum ratio transmission
(MRT) for transmit beamforming, apply an isotropic radiation pattern for AN injection, and
implement the IRSs with random phases. As for MRT, we set wk =
√
%k
GHΦHhk
‖GHΦHhk‖ , where %k is
the power allocated to legitimate user k, which is optimized together with the power allocated to
the AN to satisfy the total transmit power and secrecy constraints as stated in (6). For baseline
2, we evaluate the system performance when IRSs are not deployed3. In this case, the legitimate
3If IRSs are not used, the beams emitted by the AP are typically down tilting towards the ground to reach the legitimate users,
and therefore, different from the scenario described in Section II-A, the direct links to both the legitimate users and the potential
eavesdroppers have to be taken into consideration for baseline 2.
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users are blocked by infrastructures, and therefore the channels between the AP and the legitimate
users are assumed to be non-LoS. As the potential eavesdroppers can move freely in the network,
the channels between the AP and eavesdroppers are assumed to be still LoS-dominated, which is
an unfavorable scenario for secure communication. In baseline 2, we optimize the beamforming
vectors and AN covariance matrix at the AP by setting Φ = INt and solving problem (7).
In the following, we investigate the impact of the different system parameters by focusing on
the case of one IRS in Sections V-C to V-H while multi-IRS systems will be studied in Section
V-I.
C. Convergence of the Proposed Algorithm
In Fig. 3, we investigate the convergence of the proposed algorithm for different numbers of
antenna elements, Nt, IRS reflecting elements, M , and legitimate users, K. As can be observed
from Fig. 3, the proposed algorithm monotonically converges for all considered values of Nt, M ,
and K. In particular, for Nt = M = 5, K = 3, the proposed algorithm converges after around
15 iterations. For the case with more antennas and IRS reflecting elements, i.e., Nt = M = 10,
K = 3, the proposed algorithm needs 15 iterations more to converge since the dimensions of
the search space in problems (19) and (27) increase with Nt and M . For the case with more
legitimate users, i.e., Nt = M = 10, K = 6, the proposed algorithm needs considerably more
iterations to converge since the number of optimization variables in problem (19) and the numbers
of constraints in problems (19) and (27) both increase with the number of legitimate users. Hence,
the number of iterations required for the proposed algorithm to converge is less sensitive to the
numbers of antennas and IRS reflecting elements than to the number of legitimate users.
D. Average System Sum Rate Versus the Maximum Transmit Power
In Fig. 4, we show the average system sum-rate versus the maximum total transmit power
at the AP, P , while limiting the information leakage to the potential eavesdroppers to τk,j = 1
bits/s/Hz, ∀k, j. As can be observed from Fig. 4, the system sum-rate increases monotonically
with the maximum transmit power budget. This is because by applying the proposed optimization
framework, the SINRs of the legitimate users can be improved by providing them with additional
transmit power, which leads to an improvement of the system sum-rate. Fig. 4 also shows that
the average system sum-rate of the proposed scheme exceeds that of both considered baseline
schemes by a considerable margin. In particular, for baseline 1, the fixed MRT beamforming is
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Fig. 3. Convergence of the proposed algorithm for different
values of Nt, M , and K. The system parameters are set as
P = 30 dBm, J = 2, d1 = 60 m, κ2j = 0.1, and τk,j = 1
bits/s/Hz.
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Fig. 4. Average system sum-rate (bits/s/Hz) versus the total
transmit power of the AP (dBm) for Nt = M = 6, K = 4,
J = 2, d1 = 115 m, κ2j = 0.1, and τk,j = 1 bits/s/Hz. The
double sided arrows indicate the performance gain achieved by
the proposed scheme over the baseline schemes.
unable to fully exploit the extra DoFs introduced by the additional transmit power. In fact, the
MRT strategy in baseline 1 is unable to mitigate multiuser interference resulting in performance
saturation in the high transmit power regime. For baseline 2, the performance loss compared to
the proposed scheme is mainly due to the huge path loss of the AP-legitimate user links as the
legitimate users are assumed to be blocked. Fig. 4 reveals the huge performance gains enabled by
deploying an IRS to establish an LoS propagation environment for the legitimate users.
E. Secrecy Rate Versus the Maximum Tolerable Channel Capacity of the Eavesdroppers
Fig. 5(a) depicts the average secrecy rate defined in (5) versus the maximum tolerable channel
capacity of the potential eavesdroppers, τk,j . We assume that the maximum tolerable capacity
of different eavesdroppers are identical, i.e., τk,j = τ , ∀k, j. As can be observed, the system
secrecy rate is almost zero if the IRS is not available (baseline 2), which is mainly due to the
poor channel conditions between the AP and the legitimate users. In other words, for blocked
legitimate users, secure wireless communication cannot be guaranteed without the favorable prop-
agation environment created by the IRS. Furthermore, the average secrecy rate achieved by the
proposed scheme is significantly higher than that of baseline 1, which confirms the effectiveness
of the proposed algorithm. As shown in Fig. 5(b), when τ is small, a large portion of the
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(b) Power allocated to beamforming
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channel capacity of the potential eaves-
droppers (bits/s/Hz).
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(c) Average system sum-rate (bits/s/Hz)
and sum of maximum channel capacities
(bits/s/Hz) of the potential eavesdroppers
for the proposed scheme.
Fig. 5. The system parameters are set as Nt =M = 6, K = 3, J = 2, d1 = 50 m, κ2j = 0.1, and P = 10 dBm.
transmit power is allocated to transmitting AN to deteriorate the achievable rates of the potential
eavesdroppers, and therefore, there is less power left for information beamforming to maximize
the system sum-rate. As τ increases, the constraints on the performance of the eavesdroppers
are relaxed, and hence, more transmit power is allocated to beamforming and to improving
the system sum-rate, as can be observed in Figs. 5(b) and 5(c). Recall that the secrecy rate
is given by Rs =
∑
k∈K
[
Rk −max
j∈J
{Cj,k}
]+
. For large τ , the maximum channel capacity of
the potential eavesdroppers
∑
k∈Kmaxj∈J
{Cj,k} grows faster than the system sum-rate
∑
k∈KRk,
as can be observed in Fig. 5(c). Therefore, the secrecy rate decreases for large τ , see also Fig.
5(a). Hence, if system sum secrecy rate maximization is desired, τ has to be carefully chosen. We
note that the maximum secrecy rate can be found by solving the considered problem for different
values of τ .
F. Energy Efficiency Evaluation
IRSs are advocated as energy-efficient devices for assisting wireless communication. In Fig.
6, we investigate the energy efficiency versus the number of antenna elements at the AP and
the number of reflecting elements at the IRS. We adopt a linear power consumption model, and
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the energy efficiency (bits/J/Hz) is defined as the ratio of the system sum-rate to the total power
consumption of the system [38]
ηEE =
∑
k∈KRk
1
µ
P +NtPt + Po + PI
, (29)
where µ is the power amplifier efficiency, and Pt accounts for the circuit power consumption
introduced by deploying one antenna element, which is mainly caused by the power consumed
by the corresponding RF chain. Po is the static circuit power of the AP, consumed by the cooling
system, power supply, etc., and PI is the power consumption of the IRS controller. Following
[38], we set µ = 0.32, Pt = 35 mW, PI = 20 mW, and Po = 34 mW. In Fig. 6, we show the
average energy efficiency as a function of the number of reflecting elements at the IRS for Nt = 3
antennas (blue curves) and as a function of the number of transmit antennas for M = 3 IRS
reflecting elements (red curves). As can be observed from Fig. 6, increasing the number of IRS
elements leads to an improvement of the energy efficiency. The reason behind this is twofold. On
the one hand, as they are passive devices, enlarging the IRS size causes little additional power
consumption. On the other hand, additional phase shifters can reflect more of the power received
from the AP, which leads to a power gain, and provide more flexibility for resource allocation,
which improves the beamforming gain for the links from the IRS to the legitimate users. In contrast,
the energy efficiency is a monotone decreasing function with respect to the number of antennas
at the AP. This is mainly because more power-hungry RF chains are required as the number
of antennas increases, which outweighs the system sum-rate gain introduced by deploying more
antennas. Fig. 6 clearly demonstrates the superiority of IRS-assisted secure communication systems
compared to conventional multi-antenna secure wireless systems in terms of energy efficiency.
G. Average System Sum-Rate Versus the Number of Legitimate Users
Fig. 7 shows the average system sum-rate versus the number of legitimate users, K. As can
be observed, the system sum-rates achieved by the proposed scheme and both baseline schemes
monotonically increase with the number of legitimate users. This is due to the fact that both the
proposed scheme and the two baseline schemes are able to exploit multiuser diversity. However,
the system sum-rate and its growth rate are substantially lower for the baseline schemes compared
to the proposed scheme. In particular, the MRT strategy adopted in baseline 1 fails to mitigate
multiuser interference, which quickly leads to a saturation of the performance. On the other hand,
without the LoS links created by the IRS for the legitimate users, baseline 2 achieves the lowest
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Fig. 7. Average system sum-rate (bits/s/Hz) versus the number
of legitimate users, K, for Nt = M = 10, J = 2, d1 = 50 m,
P = 25 dBm, κ2j = 0.1, and τk,j = 1 bits/s/Hz.
system sum-rate among the three considered schemes. These observations underline the superiority
of IRS-assisted secure multiuser systems and the proposed algorithm.
H. CSI Uncertainty
Fig. 8(a) shows the average system sum-rate versus the normalized maximum channel estimation
error variance. We assume that all eavesdropping channels have the same maximum normalized
estimation error variance, i.e., κj = κ, ∀j. As can be observed, for the proposed scheme and both
baseline schemes, the average system sum-rates decrease as the quality of the CSI degrades. In
particular, the worse the quality of the estimated CSI is, the more difficult it is for the AP to perform
accurate beamforming and efficient AN jamming, which results in a lower achievable system sum-
rate. In addition, the proposed scheme significantly outperforms both baseline schemes over the
entire range of considered estimation error variances, which indicates that the proposed scheme can
exploit the spatial DoFs available for security provisioning more efficiently than the two baseline
schemes even in the presence of CSI uncertainty. In Fig. 8(b), the outage probability of the potential
eavesdroppers versus the target SINR is investigated for κ2 = 0.1. The outage probability is defined
as the probability that the received SINR values at the eavesdroppers are higher than a predefined
target SINR. For comparison, we also investigate the outage probability of a non-robust scheme.
The considered non-robust scheme treats the estimated CSI of the eavesdropping channels, i.e., H¯j ,
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Fig. 8. The system parameters are set as Nt =M = 6, K = 3, J = 2, d1 = 20 m, P = 10 dBm, and τk,j = 1 bits/s/Hz.
as perfect CSI. As can be observed, a significant outage probability reduction can be achieved via
robust optimization with the proposed scheme and even with the baseline schemes compared to the
non-robust scheme, especially in the low target SINR regime. Specifically, the outage probability of
the proposed scheme is 10% at −1 dB whereas the outage probability of the non-robust scheme is
as high as 80%. Furthermore, as we set the maximum tolerable channel capacity of the potential
eavesdroppers to τk,j = 1 bits/s/Hz, the outage probabilities of the proposed scheme and both
baseline schemes are zero when the target SINRs are no less than 0 dB (as log2(1 + 1) = 1
bits/s/Hz). In contrast, the outage probability for the non-robust scheme at 0 dB is still higher than
30%. These results confirm the robustness of the proposed scheme.
I. Single IRS or Multiple IRSs?
In this subsection, we compare the average system sum-rates achieved by deploying a single
IRS and two IRSs in the secure wireless network shown in Fig. 2. For the scenario when two IRSs
are deployed, they are symmetrically located to the East and West of the AP. We assume that there
are in total M = 10 reflecting elements available for deployment of the two IRSs. In particular,
M1 reflecting elements are allocated to IRS 1, and M2 = M −M1 elements are assigned to IRS
2. As can be observed in Fig. 9, the proposed scheme considerably outperforms both baseline
schemes for all IRS settings. In addition, it is beneficial to deploy two IRSs compared to only
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Fig. 9. Average system sum-rate (bits/s/Hz) versus the number of reflecting elements at IRS 1, for M = 10, Nt = 6, K = 3,
J = 2, d1 = d2 = 20 m, P = 25 dBm, κ2j = 0.1, and τk,j = 1 bits/s/Hz.
one. This is because multiple IRSs create several independent propagation paths including LoS
components from the AP to the legitimate users, which introduces macro diversity. Specifically,
the average distance between the IRS reflecting elements and the legitimate users are reduced by
deploying multiple IRSs in the network. In fact, the peak system sum-rate is achieved by uniformly
distributing the reflecting elements among the deployed IRSs, i.e., 5 reflecting elements for each
IRS. As indicated by Fig. 6, the performance gain diminishes as the number of reflecting elements
at one IRS grows large compared to the number of users. Therefore, a biased allocation with
exceedingly many reflecting elements at one of the IRSs is not favorable.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we incorporated IRSs in multiuser MISO systems to achieve secure communication
in the presence of multiple multi-antenna potential eavesdroppers for the challenging case where
the legitimate users do not have a LoS link to the AP. The transmit beamformers, AN covariance
matrix, and IRS phase shifts were jointly optimized to maximize the system sum-rate while
satisfying secrecy constraints for the potential eavesdroppers. We focused on the robust design
of such IRS-assisted secure wireless systems taking into account the imperfection of the CSI
of the eavesdropping channels. An efficient AO algorithm that yields a stationary solution of the
formulated non-convex optimization problem was proposed. In particular, the resulting challenging
unit modulus constrained optimization problem was transformed to a rank constrained problem, for
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which an effective d.c. function representation was employed to facilitate the application of SDR
and SCA techniques. Simulation results have verified the tremendous potential of IRSs to improve
the physical layer security of future wireless communication systems in an energy-efficient manner.
Our results also confirmed the robustness of the proposed scheme with respect to imperfect CSI and
its ability to exploit multiuser diversity. Furthermore, design guidelines for multi-IRS systems were
provided. In particular, the uniform distribution of the reflecting elements among multiple IRSs
was shown to be favorable for improving physical layer security and exploiting macro diversity
gains.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Proposition 1
According to Sylvester’s determinant identity det (I + AB) = det (I + BA), we have
max
∆Hj∈Ωj
log2 det
(
INr + Q
−1
j HjΦGwkw
H
k G
HΦHHHj
) ≤ τk,j
⇔ max
∆Hj∈Ωj
log2
(
1 + wHk G
HΦHHHj Q
−1
j HjΦGwk
) ≤ τk,j
⇔ max
∆Hj∈Ωj
Tr
(
Q−1j HjΦGwkw
H
k G
HΦHHHj
) ≤ 2τk,j − 1 (30)
(a)⇔ max
∆Hj∈Ωj
λmax
(
Q
−1/2
j HjΦGwkw
H
k G
HΦHHHj Q
−1/2
j
)
≤ 2τk,j − 1
⇔ max
∆Hj∈Ωj
(2τk,j − 1) Qj −HjΦGwkwHk GHΦHHHj  0,
where (a) holds since matrix Q−1j HjΦGwkw
H
k G
HΦHHHj has rank one, and therefore its max-
imum eigenvalue is the only non-zero eigenvalue. By substituting the expression of Qj defined
after (4) into the last LMI, we obtain the result in Proposition 1.
B. Proof of Theorem 1
We first express problem (19) in its epigraph form as follows4
minimize
ηk,pk,j≥0,Wk,Z∈HNt
− Tr (Z∇HZD1)−∑
k∈K
Tr
(
Wk∇HWkD1
)−∑
k∈K
log2
(
ηk + σ
2
l,k
)
subject to C1,C2,C4,C5,
C10: Tr (ZMk) +
∑
i∈K
Tr (WiMk) ≥ ηk, ∀k.
(31)
4To keep the presentation concise, in this proof, we simplify the notations ∇ZD1
(
W(t),Z(t)
)
and ∇WkD1
(
W(t),Z(t)
)
to
∇ZD1 and ∇WkD1, respectively.
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This problem is jointly convex with respect to the optimization variables and satisfies Slater’s
constraint qualification. Therefore, strong duality holds and the Lagrangian function in terms of
Wk is given by
L =−
∑
k∈K
Tr
(
Wk∇HWkD1
)
+ γ
∑
k∈K
Tr (Wk)−
∑
k∈K
δk
∑
i∈K
Tr (WiMk)
−
∑
k∈K
Tr (ΥkWk) +
∑
k∈K
∑
j∈J
Tr
(
Ωk,jSjΦGWkG
HΦHSHj
)
+ ξ,
(32)
where ξ includes all terms that do not involve Wk. The Lagrange multipliers associated with
constraints C1, C4, C5, and C10 in problem (31) are denoted by γ ≥ 0, Ωk,j ∈ HM+Nr , Υk ∈ HNt ,
and δk ≥ 0, respectively. Then, we investigate the structure of Wk by checking the Karush-Kuhn-
Tucker (KKT) conditions for problem (31), which are given by
K1: Υ?kW
?
k = 0, K2: γ
? ≥ 0, δ?k ≥ 0,Ω?k,j  0,Υ?k  0, K3:∇WkL (W?k) = 0, (33)
where γ?, Ω?k,j , Υ
?
k, and δ
?
k are the optimal Lagrangian multipliers for the dual problem of (31).
Since constraint C10 is active at the optimal solution, we have δk > 0. KKT condition K3 can be
further expressed as Υ?k = B
?
k − δ?kMk, where
B?k = γ
?INt −∇WkD1
(
W(t)
)− ∑
i∈K\{k}
δ?iMi +
∑
j∈J
GHΦHSHj Ω
?
k,jSjΦG. (34)
First, we discuss the case when matrix B? is full rank, i.e., Rank (B?k) = Nt. Recall that
Mk = G
HΦHhkh
H
k ΦG is a rank-one matrix. Then, we obtain for the rank of matrix Υ
?
k,
Rank (Υ?k) = Rank (B
?
k − δ?kMk) ≥ Nt − 1. (35)
The last inequality holds because Rank (A−B) ≥ Rank (A)−Rank (B) for any A and B of the
same dimension. Suppose Rank (Υ?k) = Nt, then K1 implies that W
?
k = 0, i.e., Rank (W
?
k) = 0.
Suppose Rank (Υ?k) = Nt − 1, then K1 implies that the null space of Υk is spanned by a vector,
and W?k can be expressed as
W?k = a
?
k (a
?
k)
H . (36)
Hence, the optimal solution W?k of problem (19) satisfies C6 if Rank (B
?
k) = Nt.
Next, we exploit [39, Prop. 4.1] and study the case when matrix B?k is not full rank, i.e.,
r = Rank (B?k) < Nt. Let Π
?
k ∈ CNt×(Nt−r) be the orthonormal basis of B?k’s null space, whose
columns are {pi?k,i}Nt−ri=1 . Since Υk is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the PSD constraint
C5, we have
Υ?k  0⇒
(
pi?k,i
)H
Υ?kpi
?
k,i =
(
pi?k,i
)H
(B?k − δ?kMk)pi?k,i ≥ 0⇒ δ?k
∣∣∣(pi?k,i)H GHΦHhk∣∣∣2 ≤ 0.
(37)
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Since constraint C10 is active at the optimal solution, we have δk > 0. Therefore,∣∣∣(pi?k,i)H GHΦHhk∣∣∣2 = 0⇒MkΠ?k = 0⇒ B?kΠ?k − δ?kMkΠ?k = Υ?kΠ?k = 0, (38)
which means that Πk spans Nt − r orthogonal dimensions of Υ?k’s null space. Therefore, let N?k
be the orthonormal basis of Υ?k’s null space, where Rank (N
?
k) ≥ Nt − r. In addition, we have
Rank (Υ?k)
(b)
≥ r − 1⇒ Rank (N?k) = Nt − Rank (Υ?k) ≤ Nt − r + 1, (39)
where (b) follows from the same inequality as (35). As a result, the rank of N?k is either Nt − r
or Nt − r + 1. Suppose Rank (N?k) = Nt − r, according to (38), we have N?k = Π?k. According
to K1 and (38), W?k can be expressed as W
?
k =
∑Nt−r
i=1 c
?
k,ipi
?
k,i
(
pi?k,i
)H , where c?k,i ∈ R is a
scaling factor for pi?k,i. However, in this case, we have W
?
kMk = 0 since we have proved that
MkΠ
?
k = 0 in (38). This means that there is no information received by legitimate user k even if
we allocate power to the beamformer for legitimate user k. Hence, this cannot correspond to the
optimal solution of problem (19). Suppose Rank (N?k) = Nt − r + 1, then we can express N?k as
N?k =
[
Π?k a
?
k
]
and therefore the optimal solution W?k can be written in the form of
W?k = a
?
ka
?
k (a
?
k)
H +
Nt−r∑
i=1
c?k,ipi
?
k,i
(
pi?k,i
)H
, (40)
where c?k,i > 0, a
?
k ∈ R is a scaling factor for a?k, (Π?k)H a?k = 0 since N?k is the orthonormal basis
of Υ?k’s null space, and we have Υ
?
ka
?
k = 0 according to (38). Therefore, we propose to construct
an optimal rank-one W˜?k when matrix B
?
k is not full rank as follows:
W˜?k = W
?
k−
Nt−r∑
i=1
c?k,ipi
?
k,i
(
pi?k,i
)H
= a?ka
?
k (a
?
k)
H , Z˜? = Z? +
Nt−r∑
i=1
c?k,ipi
?
k,i
(
pi?k,i
)H
, p˜?k,j = p
?
k,j.
(41)
Note that with the construction in (41), we obtain a rank-one solution W˜?k and a PSD matrix Z˜
?.
Hence, the remaining tasks for proving the tightness of SDR are to check the feasibility of W˜?k
and Z˜?, and to show that this construction yields the same optimal objective value as W?k and Z
?.
It is easy to see that the construction in (41) does not affect the value of N and constraint C1 in
(16) due to the fact that Z? +
∑
k∈KW
?
k = Z˜
? +
∑
k∈K W˜
?
k. For constraint C4 in problem (19),
we have
Pk,j + SjΦG
[
(2τk,j − 1) Z˜? − W˜?k
]
GHΦHSHj
= Pk,j + SjΦG [(2
τk,j − 1) Z? −W?k] GHΦHSHj + SjΦGD?kGHΦHSHj ,
(42)
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where
D?k = (2
τk,j − 1)
∑
j 6=k
Nr−r∑
i=1
c?j,ipi
?
j,i
(
pi?j,i
)H
+ 2τk,j
Nr−r∑
i=1
c?k,ipi
?
k,i
(
pi?k,i
)H  0. (43)
Therefore, the LMIs in C4 still hold for W˜?k and Z˜
?. Finally, we show that the construction in
(41) does not change the value of the last two terms in the objective function of problem (19).
According to (18), we have
− Tr (Z?∇HZD1)−∑
k∈K
Tr
(
W?k∇HWkD1
)
=
1
ln 2
∑
j∈K
Tr
[(
Z? +
∑
k 6=j W
?
k
)
Mj
]
Tr
[(
Z(t) +
∑
i 6=j W
(t)
i
)
Mj
]
+ σ2l,j
, (44)
where (
Z˜? +
∑
k 6=j
W˜?k
)
Mj =
(
Z? +
∑
k 6=j
W?k
)
Mj +
(
Nr−r∑
i=1
c?j,ipi
?
j,i
(
pi?j,i
)H)
Mj
=
(
Z? +
∑
k 6=j
W?k
)
Mj.
(45)
The last equality holds since we have proved that MkΠ?k = 0 in (38), which completes the proof
of Theorem 1.
C. Proof of Proposition 2
Denote the objective function of problem (22) as f (V), and let V? be its optimal solution, that
is, f (V?) ≤ f (V) , for all V that satisfy5 ‖V‖∗ − ‖V‖2 = 0. Denote the objective function of
problem (24) as g (V; ρ). Since Vs is the optimal solution of problem (24) for penalty factor ρs,
we have g (Vs; ρs) ≤ g (V?; ρs), which leads to the inequality
f(Vs) +
1
2ρs
(‖Vs‖∗ − ‖Vs‖2) ≤ f(V?) +
1
2ρs
(‖V?‖∗ − ‖V?‖2) = f(V?), (46)
where the last equality holds as V? is the optimal solution of problem (22) and therefore the
rank-one constraint must be satisfied. By rewriting (46), we obtain
‖Vs‖∗ − ‖Vs‖2 ≤ 2ρs [f(V?)− f(Vs)] . (47)
Suppose V¯ is a limit point of sequence {Vs} and there is an infinite subsequence S such that
lim
s∈S
Vs = V¯. By taking the limit as s→∞, s ∈ S, on both sides of (47), we have∥∥V¯∥∥∗ − ∥∥V¯∥∥2 = lims∈S (‖Vs‖∗ − ‖Vs‖2) ≤ lims∈S 2ρs [f(V?)− f(Vs)] ρs→0= 0, (48)
5In this proof, we investigate the effect of moving constraint C9 into the objective function of problem (22). Therefore, we do
not consider constraints C4, C7, and C8 as they are common constraints shared by both problems (22) and (24).
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where the first equality holds due to the continuity of the function ‖X‖∗−‖X‖2. Hence, we have∥∥V¯∥∥∗−∥∥V¯∥∥2 = 0, so V¯ is feasible for problem (22). Furthermore, by taking the limit as s→∞
for s ∈ S in (46), we have by the non-negativity of ρs and of the term ‖Vs‖∗ − ‖Vs‖2 that
f
(
V¯
) ≤ f (V¯)+ lim
s∈S
1
2ρs
(‖Vs‖∗ − ‖Vs‖2) ≤ f (V?) . (49)
As V¯ is a feasible point whose objective value is no larger than that of the optimal solution V?,
we conclude that V¯, too, is an optimal solution for (22), which completes the proof.
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